The Review of Economic Studies is one of the core journals in economics. It is essential reading for economists, consistently ranking among the top five journals.

The seminal paper by Baron and Ferejohn (1989) leaves significant gaps in our understanding of open rule bargaining. We aim to fill these gaps by providing a fresh analysis of open rule bargaining. Our approach relies on an appealing class of stationary equilibria. In this class, we show that delays tend to be longer and allocations tend to be less egalitarian than originally predicted by Baron and Ferejohn.

Discrete choice data allow researchers to recover differences in utilities, but these differences may not suffice to identify policy-relevant counterfactuals of interest. In fact, in the case of dynamic discrete choice models, only a narrow set of counterfactuals are point-identified. In this paper, we explore how much one can learn about counterfactual outcomes of interest within this framework.

An agent samples projects over time, observing quality for each, while a principal can select at most one. The principal values quality, whereas the agent only wants a project chosen. Transfers are unavailable, but the principal can verify quality by paying a cost. We fully characterize the dynamics of verification by determining optimal mechanisms for this problem.

I study racial disparities in the criminal justice system by analyzing abnormal bunching in the distribution of crack-cocaine amounts used in federal sentencing. I compare cases sentenced before and after the Fair Sentencing Act, a 2010 law that changed the 10-year mandatory minimum threshold for crack-cocaine from 50g to 280g.

I study linear panel data models with predetermined regressors (such as lagged dependent variables) where coefficients are individual-specific, allowing for heterogeneity in the effects of the regressors on the dependent variable. I show that the model is not point-identified in a short panel context but rather partially identified, and I characterize the identified sets for the mean, variance, and CDF of the coefficient distribution.

Manager pay has increased considerably since 1980, and so has inequality in manager pay. Over the same period, there has been a sharp rise in market power. We start from the premise that the role of managers is to increase firm productivity. When markets are imperfectly competitive, productivity not only helps firm grow in size, productivity also affects market power.