The Review of Economic Studies is one of the core journals in economics. It is essential reading for economists, consistently ranking among the top five journals.

We conduct an experimental analysis of selective disclosure in communication. In the model, an informed sender aims to influence a receiver by disclosing verifiable evidence that is selected from a larger pool of available evidence. Our experimental design leverages this model’s rich comparative statics, allowing us to systematically quantify the effects of selection relative to concealment.

We show that the formalization of representativeness (Kahneman and Tversky (1972)) developed by Gennaioli and Shleifer (2010) features an intrinsic connection between uncertainty and overreaction. In the time series domain, we develop this connection in a smooth version of Diagnostic Expectations (DE), where overreaction varies smoothly with uncertainty.

This paper studies a multi-product monopolist facing a privately informed consumer with additive and type-increasing valuations. Separate monopoly pricing is robustly optimal with respect to the type distribution if and only if the marginal rate of substitution between each pair of goods is monotone.

This paper studies the impact of income-based criminal punishments on crime. In Finland, speeding tickets become income-dependent if the driver’s speed exceeds the speeding limit by more than 20 km/h, leading to a substantial jump in the size of the speeding ticket. Contrary to predictions of a traditional Becker model, individuals do not bunch below the fine hike.

University access has significantly expanded in OECD countries, and further growth figures prominently in political agendas. We study possible consequences of historical and future expansions in a stochastic, general equilibrium Roy model where tertiary educational attainment is determined by cognitive ability and socioeconomic disadvantage.

We introduce a survey instrument to measure earnings risk allowing for the possibility of quitting or being fired from the current job. We find these transitions to be the key drivers of subjective risk. A link with administrative data provides multiple credibility checks and reveals that subjective earnings risk varies systematically across the population.