The Review of Economic Studies is one of the core journals in economics. It is essential reading for economists, consistently ranking among the top five journals.

We apply classical statistical decision theory to a large class of treatment choice problems with partial identification. We show that, in a general class of problems with Gaussian likelihood, all decision rules are admissible; it is maximin-welfare optimal to ignore all data; and, for severe enough partial identification, there are infinitely many minimax-regret optimal decision rules, all of which sometimes randomize the policy recommendation.

We study narratives about the macroeconomy—the stories people tell to explain macroeconomic phenomena—in the context of a historic surge in inflation. In our empirical analysis, we field surveys with more than 10,000 US households and 100 academic experts, measure economic narratives in open-ended questions, and represent them as Directed Acyclic Graphs.

We evaluate the efficiency of dynamic linked environmental regulation. Linked regulation allows inspectors who uncover violations at one plant to increase future enforcement at other plants that share a common owner. When compliance costs are correlated, regulators can then target scarce enforcement resources towards bad actors without inspecting everyone.

We formalize a research design to uncover the mechanisms underlying long-term reductions in energy consumption caused by a widely implemented nudge. We consider two channels: technology adoption and habit formation. Using data from 38 natural field experiments, we isolate the role of technology adoption by comparing treatment and control homes after the initial resident moves, which discontinues the treatment for a home.

We examine how the rise of institutional ownership has influenced firms’ political activities. We find that, after the acquisition of a large stake, a firm’s political action committee giving mirrors more closely that of the acquiring investor. Consistent with a causal interpretation, this pattern is also observed for acquisitions driven by new index inclusions.

Reference-dependent preferences can explain several puzzling observations about organizational change. We introduce a dynamic model in which a firm bargains with loss-averse workers about organizational change and wages. We show that change is often stagnant or slow for many periods, followed by a sudden boost in productivity triggered by a crisis.