The Review of Economic Studies is one of the core journals in economics. It is essential reading for economists, consistently ranking among the top five journals.

This paper combines personnel records of the U.S. government with census data to study how exposure to greater female representation at work can persistently reduce intergenerational gender gaps in labor market outcomes. Exploiting city-by-department variation in the sudden expansion of female employment during World War I, we find that daughters of civil servants exposed to female co-workers are more likely to work later in life.

We propose a new model of internal migration, based on persistent and spatially-correlated idiosyncratic utility. The model is motivated by a new fact in the data that simple moving cost models struggle to match: the t-year interstate migration rate is proportional to the square root of t.

This paper studies the long-term effects of technology and know-how transfers on structural transformations. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union supported the construction of the 156 Projects, which were large-scale, capital-intensive industrial clusters in China. These projects included a technology transfer, consisting of state-of-the-art Soviet machinery and equipment, and a know-how transfer, via the training of Chinese engineers, production supervisors, and high-skilled technicians by Soviet experts.

This paper presents a theoretical case for replacement of conventional heteroskedasticity-consistent and cluster-robust variance estimators with jackknife variance estimators, in the context of linear regression with heteroskedastic and/or cluster-dependent observations. We examine the bias of variance estimation and the coverage probabilities of confidence intervals. Concerning bias, we show that conventional variance estimators have full downward worst-case bias, while our jackknife variance estimator is never downward biased.

We analyse discontinuous Markovian strategies for differential games. The best response correspondence uniquely maps almost all profiles of opponents’ strategies back to the strategy space. We thus make Markov-perfect equilibria in a wide class of differential games well-behaved, resolving a long-standing open problem. We provide a readily applicable necessary and sufficient condition for best responses and Markov-perfect Nash equilibria.

Despite the increasing importance of multiple priors in various domains of economics, choice-based incentive-compatible multiple-prior elicitation remains an open problem. This paper develops a solution, comprising a preference-based identification of a subject’s probability interval for an event, and a method for eliciting it. The method applies under weak decision-theoretic assumptions, with no need for probabilistic sophistication.