The Review of Economic Studies is one of the core journals in economics. It is essential reading for economists, consistently ranking among the top five journals.

We prove a central limit theorem for network formation models with strategic interactions and homophilous agents. Since data often consists of observations on a single large network, we consider an asymptotic framework in which the network size diverges. We argue that a modification of “stabilization” conditions from the literature on geometric graphs provides a useful high-level formulation of weak dependence which we utilize to establish an abstract central limit theorem.

How do regional productivity shocks or transportation infrastructure improvements affect aggregate welfare? In a general class of spatial equilibrium models, we provide a formula for aggregate welfare changes, decomposed into terms associated with (i) technology (Fogel 1964, Hulten 1978), (ii) spatial dispersion of marginal utility, (iii) fiscal externalities, (iv) technological externalities, and (v) redistribution.

Existing tests of reference-dependent preferences assume universal loss aversion. This paper examines the implications of heterogeneity in gain-loss attitudes for such tests. In experiments on labor supply and exchange behavior, we first measure gain-loss attitudes and then study a canonical treatment effect that distinguishes different models of reference dependence.

We present a method to determine optimal monetary policy in heterogeneous-agent economies with nominal frictions and aggregate shocks, under various assumptions regarding fiscal policy. We analyze models with either sticky prices or sticky wages. In the sticky-price economy, when fiscal policy is optimally set, optimal monetary policy implements price stability.

While men and women make joint decisions about fertility, women give birth and are more likely to learn about a significant cost of childbearing—maternal health risk. Within couples in Zambia, men have systematically lower awareness of maternal risk factors and higher desire for children than their wives. We develop a model in which information asymmetries between partners over maternal health risk can persist in equilibrium due to strategic incentives and can generate disagreement over fertility that cannot be resolved with transfers.

We derive asymptotically optimal statistical decision rules for discrete choice problems when payoffs depend on a partially-identified parameter θ and the decision maker can use a point-identified parameter µ to deduce restrictions on θ. Examples include treatment choice under partial identification and pricing with rich unobserved heterogeneity.